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A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING: GAFFNEYAND
THE IMPROPER ROLE OF POLITICS IN
THE DISTRICTING PROCESS
Robert A. Koch*
The Supreme Court unanimously agrees that excessive partisan gerrymandering is
unconstitutional. A plurality of the Court, however, would hold partisan gerry-
mandering claims to be nonjusticiable due to the lack of a judicially manageable
standard. This Note synthesizes the opinions of a majority of the Court in Vieth v.
Jubelirer on the precise harms of partisan gerrymandering and argues that exces-
sive partisan gerrymandering unconstitutionally burdens the representational
rights of individual voters. This Note proposes a judicially manageable standard
to address that representational harm based on the Court's standard in Shaw v.
Reno.
INTRODUCTION
In July 2001, Michigan Republicans attempted to gain three
congressional seats by passing a redistricting plan that "packed"
some Democrats into five overwhelmingly Democratic districts,
and "cracked" remaining Democrats among ten Republican-
majority districts.' Republicans passed the plan so quickly that it
failed to account for over four thousand Michiganders.2 Rather
than send the bill back to the legislature and risk public debate,
the Secretary of the Senate unilaterally amended the plan, and the
Republican governor signed the revised bill into law on the after-
noon of September 11, 2001.
* BA 2000, Duke University; J.D. expected 2006, University of Michigan Law
School. Thanks to the members of the Journal of Law Reform for their tireless efforts in pub-
lishing this piece, and to my family and friends for their love and unending support. This
Note is dedicated to McKenna and Ethan Koch-may this Note be one small step towards
leaving you a better world.
1. O'Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Sam Hirsch, The
United States Hose of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional
Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 206 (2003). See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
286 n.7 (2004) ("'Packing' refers to the practice of filling a district with a supermajority of a
given group or party. 'Cracking' involves the splitting of a group or party among several
districts to deny that group or party a majority in any of those districts."); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 117 n.6 (1986).
2. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 206-07.
3. Id. at 207. The District Court upheld the plan. O'Lear, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 859 ("We
find that the plaintiffs have alleged disproportionality in abundance, and that the amended
complaint contains ample charges of discriminatory motive and procedural irregularities.
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In May 2003, Texas Republicans attempted to gain up to seven
seats in the state House of Representatives by redistricting a mere
two years after the traditional, decennial, post-Census redistricting
process.4 In response, fifty-one Texas Democrats fled the state to
prevent a quorum and thereby block a vote on the plan, while state
troopers attempted to hunt down three Democrats hiding in the
state to force a quorum. Ultimately, the Democrats returned and
the Republicans passed a districting map that looked "like an at-
tempt to diagram an oil spill using Legos."
6
Gerrymandering-shaping electoral districts for political advan-
tage-is not a new phenomenon. The term was coined almost two
hundred years ago after the Governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge
Gerry, created a salamander-shaped district for partisan gain.7 But
technological advancements have taken gerrymandering to a new
level. "Recent cases now document in microscopic detail the aston-
ishing precision with which redistricters can carve up individual
precincts and distribute them between districts with confidence
concerning the racial and partisan consequences."8 "[L] egislatures,
experts, and courts can use databases to map electoral districts in a
matter of hours, not months."9
A unanimous Supreme Court agrees that excessive partisan ger-
rymandering is harmful to the democratic process. 10 However, the
The deficiency here is the lack of any claim of the 'other indicia' which is required to show
the discriminatory effect which Bandemer requires.").
4. See, e.g., Democrats of Texas on Lam in Oklahoma, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 14, 2003, at
IA; 78th Texas Legislature, HOUSTON CHRON., May 14, 2003, at A01.
5. 78th Texas Legislature, supra note 4, at A01.
6. John Ratliff, Texas Republicans Crossed the Line This Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003,
at BO. The District Court upheld the plan. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 515 (E.D.
Tex. 2004).
7. E.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 606 (ency-
clopedic ed. 1951).
8. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE
LJ. 2505, 2553-54 (1997); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-
Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 232 (1995) ("Computer technology has evolved
dramatically to the point that an increasing number of actors are able to carve ever more
intricate districting patterns that seek to advance a particular political agenda."); Pamela S.
Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REv. 731, 736
(1998) ("Finer-grained census data, better predictive methods, and more powerful com-
puters allow for increasingly sophisticated equipopulous gerrymanders.").
9. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
10. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Comment: Erog
v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REv. 170,
251 (2001) ("Like these cases drawn from realms as diverse as the separation of church and
state and gender classification, Bush v. Gore lays great emphasis on appearances-both of
individual ballots and of the vote-counting process as a whole.").
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Court cannot agree on what it should do, if anything, in response.
It appears hopelessly split on the exact constitutional harm caused
by partisan gerrymandering; without consensus on a harm, there is
no agreement on which judicial standards courts should utilize in
evaluation such claims; and without a clear judicially manageable
standard, the Court is split on whether such claims are even justici-
able.1 Commentators cannot agree about the nature of the harm
or the appropriate remedy either.'2
When the Court revisited this issue last year, a plurality correctly
stated that " [e] ighteen years ofjudicial effort with virtually nothing
to show for it justify" revisiting partisan gerrymandering prece-
dent. 3  But instead of focusing on Davis v. Bandeme 1 4 and
attempting to overrule its holding that partisan gerrymandering
claims are justiciable,1-5 the Court should have focused its efforts on
Gaffney v. Cummings and its contention that "l[p] olitics and political
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportion-
ment."
16
Part I of this Note examines the Court's repeated forays into the
partisan gerrymandering arena, particularly its failed attempts at
11. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion) ("[No judicially discernible and
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lack-
ing them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable .... ");
id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The First Amendment may be the
more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering."); id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen partisanship is the legisla-
ture's sole motivation-when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all
traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage-the governing body
cannot be said to have acted impartially."); id. at 343 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) ("[1]f unfairness is sufficiently demonstrable, the guarantee of equal protection
condemns it as a denial of substantial equality." (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
129-34 (1986) (plurality opinion))); id. at 360 (BreyerJ., dissenting) ("[O]ne circumstance
where use of purely political boundary-drawing factors can amount to a serious, and reme-
diable, abuse, [is] namely, the unjustified use of political factors to entrench a minority in
power.").
12. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 1, at 204 (arguing a harm to political accountability and
responsiveness); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 644 (1998) (arguing dominant political parties
lock up the political process to forestall competition); Ellen D. Katz, Resurmcting the White
Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 391 (2004) (arguing a prevention of meaningful political
participation); Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REv. 649, 680-81
(2002) (arguing for a judicial retreat from the political thicket); Note, A New Map: Partisan
Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1196, 1210 (2004) [hereinafter A
New Map] (arguing an injury to federalism).
13. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion).
14. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
15. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion).
16. 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
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articulating the harm of partisan gerrymandering and subsequent
standards to measure that harm. Part II argues that the proper
constitutional inquiry is the harm caused to the individual voter
when partisan concerns play a role in districting. Allowing politics
to dominate districting runs counter to popular democracy and
the essence of the Constitution as a populist document. To main-
tain the role of the individual voter in our democratic process,
Gaffney should be overruled. Part III proposes a judicially manage-
able standard to adjudicate this harm, guided by Shaw v. Reno.7
When politics predominate over neutral districting principles, and
a districting plan "rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts"
8
solely on the basis of politics, then a claim arises under the Equal
Protection Clause.
I. THE SUPREME BUNGLING OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
"The right to vote is personal ... ."19 "No right is more precious
in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live."20 Accordingly, "[lt] he right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any re-
strictions on that fight strike at the heart of representative
government."2' Districting typically does not interfere with the
right since "the achieving of fair and effective representation for all
citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment
.... ,,22 However, these broad principles fly out the window in the
world of partisan gerrymandering. Part L.A discusses how the Court
gave a green light to the aim of advancing partisan politics. Part I.B
examines the framing of the partisan gerrymandering harm as a
political group harm, and the subsequent standard the Court es-
tablished to adjudicate it. Part I.C analyzes the Court's last partisan
gerrymandering decision and the uncertain, standardless claim left
in its wake.
17. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
18. Id. at 649.
19. United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227 (1918) (citations omitted).
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1964)).
21. Id. at 555.
22. Id. at 565-66.
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A. Gaffney and the Permissible Role of Politics
The Court first addressed the role of politics in Gaffney v. Cum-
mings.23  In Gaffney, an apportionment board redistricted
Connecticut's General Assembly after a bipartisan commission
failed to agree on a plan. 4 The Board sought to create districts that
provided "a rough scheme of proportional representation of the
two major political parties" (Republicans and Democrats) .2
Plaintiffs challenged the plan on two fronts: that the deviation of
districts from the average district size violated the Reynolds v. Sims
one-person, one-vote requirement, 26 and that the dominance of
political concerns in redistricting constituted an impermissible
partisan gerrymander.27 In upholding the redistricting plan, the
Court rejected both arguments. With respect to one-person, one-
vote, the Court found that "minor deviations from mathematical
equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make
out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State."28
With respect to the invidiousness of partisan gerrymandering, the
Court felt that " [i] t would be idle ... to contend that any political
consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment
plan is sufficient to invalidate it."
29
In rejecting the claim of partisan gerrymandering, the Court
abandoned the Reynolds notion that the goal of districting is "effec-
tive representation for all citizens."30 Instead, the Court gave a nod
to political party self-interest, maintaining that "[t] he very essence
of districting is to produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-
result than would be reached with elections at large .... Politics
and political considerations are inseparable from districting and
apportionment."3" To support its holding, the Court merely in-
ferred the permissibility of a political purpose from the fact that
23. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
24. Id. at 736.
25. Id. at 738. Such gerrymanders have been dubbed "sweetheart gerrymanders" based
on their bipartisan cooperation. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political
Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593, 625 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionaliza-
tion of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. Rv. 28, 60 (2004).
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 568 (1964).
27. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 738-39.
28. Id. at 745.
29. Id. at 752.
30. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
31. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
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districting inevitably has a political effect. 3 The Court never exam-
ined whether or not politics should play a role in districting,
particularly a dominant one, and it implicitly indicated that the
extent and role of the political purpose is irrelevant. By rationaliz-
ing that a "politically mindless approach may produce, whether
intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results,, 33 the
Court lost sight of the fact that a gerrymander is, by definition, the
purposeful manipulation of district lines for political gain.34 The
Court reasoned political purpose out of the Equal Protection ger-
rymandering equation and gave a green light to extreme partisan
gerrymandering.
B. Bandemer 's Political Party Burden
The Court was called upon to curb the practice of adversarial
partisan gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer.5 In Bandemer, Indi-
ana Republicans redistricted the state legislature after the 1980
Census by attempting to pack and crack Democrats throughout the
state. 36 The Speaker of the House admitted that the purpose of the
plan was "to save as many incumbent Republicans as possible."37
The House of Representatives and Senate maps did not consis-
tently follow county or city lines.38 In the 1982 election, Democrats
received 51.9% of House votes but garnered only 43% of the seats;
32. Id. ("It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape
of districts may well determine the political complexion of the area.... The reality is that
districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.").
33. Id.
34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 612-
13 ("The idea that the harm of gerrymandering may result without design runs against the
conventional supposition that, at bottom, the gerrymander is a willful attempt to advance
one's own interest and harm one's rivals.").
35. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The Court could have addressed partisan gerrymandering in
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). In Karcher, NewJersey Democrats had packed Repub-
licans into two particularly notorious districts, one resembling a swan, and one resembling a
fishhook. Id. at 762 (Stevens, J., concurring). A plurality of the Court dodged the partisan
gerrymandering bullet by rejecting the districting plan on one-person, one-vote grounds,
even though the population deviations were inconsequential. Id. at 744 (plurality opinion);
see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1656 (1993). Compare Karcher, 462 U.S. at 728 (invalidating a plan with
a maximum deviation of 0.6984%), with Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737 (1973) (up-
holding a plan with a maximum deviation of 1.81%).
36. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 116-17.
37. Id. at 116 n.5 (quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind.
1984)).
38. Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
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in two of the larger counties, Democrats received 47% of the vote
but garnered only 14% of the House seats. 9
Plaintiffs challenged the plan on Equal Protection grounds.,° In
examining the redistricting plan, the Court held that partisan ger-
rymandering claims are justiciable,4 ' but then splintered as to the
appropriate standard with which to adjudicate them. The plurality
established a discriminatory intent and effect requirement in the
vein of its other Equal Protection jurisprudence,42 while Justice
Powell focused on the overall fairness of the districts,4 and Justice
O'Connor believed the claims to be nonjusticiable. The Court
upheld the plan when the plurality found that the plan did not sat-
isfy its discriminatory effect requirement. 
5
Aside from deciding the question of justiciability, Bandemer is
important in two other respects. First, it framed the issue of parti-
san gerrymandering as a political party issue. Despite their
disagreements as to justiciability and standards, all nine Justices
viewed the issue as one of group representation." This approach
represented a shift in vote dilution Equal Protection jurisprudence,
which had viewed the right to vote as an individual right, not a
group right.
4
1
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 124.
42. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion) ("[I]n order to succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were
required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and
an actual discriminatory effect on that group." (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68
(1980))).
43. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should
be required to offer proof concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness of a
redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tend-
ing to show vote dilution.").
44. Id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment).
45. Id. at 134 (plurality opinion); id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J. &
Rehnquist,J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 125 n.9 (plurality opinion) ("[A] group level ... must be our focus in this
type of claim .... "); id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) ("The rights asserted in this case are group rights to an equal share of
political power and representation ... ."); see also id. at 167 (Powell,J.,joined by Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The concept of 'representation' necessarily
applies to groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not.").
47. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("[T]he right of suffrage can be de-
nied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (framing vote dilution as an issue of
debasing the individual right to vote).
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Second, the plurality's two-part test set an extremely high bur-
den of proof for future plaintiffs to meet in order to obtain relief.
The plurality focused on the tangible effect of election returns, but
because prior cases "clearly foreclose [d] any claim that the Consti-
tution requires proportional representation,"48 disproportionate
losses at the polls alone would not state a claim .45 As a result, they
altered the Equal Protection analysis to accommodate the political
party inquiry, imposing "a threshold showing... derived from the
peculiar characteristics of these political gerrymandering claims." 50
To state a claim, the political group must have been "denied its
chance to effectively influence the political process .. . ."" This
claim must be "supported by evidence of continued frustration of
the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority
of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process."5 2 A his-
tory of disproportionate results, actual or projected, are required;5
results of a single election are insufficient.5
In creating such a strong burden, the plurality reasoned that
"unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a
voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole."55 The test ultimately attempted to draw a constitutional line
between simple losing and too much losing. The rest of the Court
predicted this nebulous, "peculiar" standard would be unmanage-
able.
48. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion) (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 153, 156, 160 (1971); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973)).
49. Id. at 132.
50. Id. at 134 n.14; see also id. at 171 n.10 (Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing how the plurality's test alters the Equal Protection
analysis).
51. Id. at 132-33 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 133.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id. at 135.
55. Id. at 132.
56. Id. at 155 (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (" [T]his standard will over time either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or else
evolve towards some loose form of proportionality."); id. at 171 (Powell,J.,joined by Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The final and most basic flaw in the plural-
ity's opinion is its failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and
courts.").
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C. Vieth s Uncertain Future
Eighteen years after Bandemer, the Court revisited the justiciabil-
ity and standards of partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer.i
In the years since Bandemer, its test had proven to be unmanage-
able. The combination of a murky standard and an impossibly high
burden of proof had resulted in only one court ever finding a con-
sistent degradation of a political group's influence on the political
process,58 and that case was rendered moot when the next election
proved the District Court's projection of disproportionate results
wrong.59 Bandemer had "served almost exclusively as an invitation to
litigation without much prospect of redress."60
In Vieth, the Pennsylvania General Assembly had redistricted its
congressional districts pursuant to the 2000 Census.61 In doing so,
Pennsylvania Republicans ignored local boundaries and drew ir-
regularly shaped districts as a means of gaining partisan advantage
and retribution against Democrats for gerrymanders in other
states.62 Plaintiffs challenged the plan, inter alia, under the Equal
Protection Clause, claiming an unconstitutional partisan gerry-
mander.6' The District Court dismissed this claim, and the Supreme
Court affirmed.'
In affirming the dismissal, however, the Court remained as frac-
tured as ever on the justiciability and standards of partisan
gerrymandering. A plurality wanted to close the door on partisan
gerrymandering claims forever. While acknowledging that "an ex-
cessive injection of politics is unlawful,"65 the plurality nevertheless
felt that "[e]ighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have
persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of principled application.
We would therefore overrule that case, and decline to adjudicate
57. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
58. Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 F. Supp. 722, 732 (E.D.N.C. 1994) ("Plaintiffs have
made a sufficient showing that they have been and will continue to be irreparably harmed by
the present superior court electoral process."); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279-80, 282-83 (plurality
opinion).
59. Ragan v. Vosburgh, Nos. 96-2621, 96-2687, 96-2739, 1997 WL 168292, at *5-6 (4th
Cir. Apr. 10, 1997) ("[T]he challenge to the statewide election scheme is unquestionably
moot with respect to elections subsequent to those conducted in November 1994.. ").
60. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (plurality opinion) (quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 886 (rev. 2d ed. 2002)).
61. Id. at 272.
62. Id. at 272-73.
63. Id. at 272.
64. Id. at 306; id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 293 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
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these political gerrymandering claims."6 6 Justice Kennedy, concur-
ring in the judgment, agreed with the plurality that "[t] he failings
of the many proposed standards for measuring the burden a ger-
rymander imposes on representational rights make our
intervention improper. "67 However, recognizing that "[t]he or-
dered working of our Republic, and of the democratic process,
depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of
government," he declined to hold partisan gerrymandering to be
nonjusticiable in the hope that a manageable standard "will
emerge in the future., 6s The four dissenters agreed with Justice
Kennedy that partisan gerrymandering claims should remain justi-
ciable,69  and then proceeded to propose three different,S 70
independent standards for adjudicating such claims.
The two notable takeaways from Bandemer beyond the issue of
justiciability-the political party harm and high burden of proof-
suffered different fates in Vieth. While the Court unanimously rec-
ognized the failure of the Bandemer standard, 71 a majority of the
Justices in Vieth continued to view the harm of partisan gerryman-
dering as a group harm.72 Under a group harm view, the plurality
rejected applying the Equal Protection Clause to political parties in
• 73
voting. The notion of a discriminatory effect inherently has a non-
discriminatory baseline against which to measure itself. The plural-
ity reasoned that an Equal Protection claim in this context would
66. Id. at 306.
67. Id. at 317 (KennedyJ., concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. at 311, 316-17.
69. Id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e reaffirm the central holding of the Court
in Davis v. Bandemer... " (citation omitted)); id. at 346 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("I would therefore preserve Davis's holding that political gerrymandering is a
justiciable issue ... ."); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Sometimes purely political 'ger-
rymandering' will fail to advance any plausible democratic objective while simultaneously
threatening serious democratic harm. And sometimes when that is so, courts can identify an
equal protection violation and provide a remedy.").
70. Id. at 318 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen partisanship is the legislature's sole
motivation-when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all traditional
districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage-the governing body cannot be said
to have acted impartially."); id. at 343 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[I]f
unfairness is sufficiently demonstrable, the guarantee of equal protection condemns it as a
denial of substantial equality." (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129-34 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion))); id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne circumstance where use of
purely political boundary-drawing factors can amount to a serious, and remediable, abuse,
[is] namely, the unjustified use of political factors to entrench a minority in power.").
71. See id. at 292 (plurality opinion) ("[The] four dissenters come up with three differ-
ent standards-all of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one
proposed here by appellants.... .").
72. Id. at 288; id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 365-67
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
. 73. Id. at 288 (plurality opinion).
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have to rely on a baseline of proportional representation,"4 which
the Constitution does not require.75 Perhaps realizing this, Justice
Kennedy anchored his group harm instead in the First Amend-
ment. 6 In his mind, "[t]he inquiry is ... whether political
classifications were used to burden a group's representational
rights."7 7 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, continued to view the
group harm as anchored in the Equal Protection Clause, arguing
that the injury is suffered by the majority party when the minority
party entrenches itself.78 Similar to Justice Breyer, the three other
dissenters maintained that partisan gerrymandering sounds in
Equal Protection, but they recast the harm as individual for the
first time. Justice Stevens viewed it as a representational harm suf-
fered by individual voters,79 while Justice Souter, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, viewed the harm as an Equal Protection injury suffered
by individual voters redistricted based on their political affiliation.80
Vieth placed partisan gerrymandering claims back at square one.
Their justiciability is in doubt, placed in an apparent holding pat-
tern until a manageable standard for adjudication emerges.8' The
Court effectively sent out a casting call for a standard, for a theo-
retical and constitutional characterization of the harm inflicted by
partisan gerrymandering that will provide a judicially manageable
standard to lead the Court through this thickest of political thick-
ets.
82
74. Id.; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist,J., concurring in thejudgment).
75. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288 (plurality opinion) ("[T]his standard rests upon the principle
that groups ... have a right to proportional representation. But the Constitution contains
no such principle,"); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion) (citing Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973)).
76. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The First
Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.").
77. Id. at 315.
78. Id. at 365-67 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
79. Id. at 330-32 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
80. Id. at 350 (Souter, J.,joined by GinsburgJ., dissenting).
81. The plurality and Justice Stevens disagree over Vieth's justiciability holding, with
each side claimingJustice Kennedy's vote on justiciability. Id. at 305 (plurality opinion) ('We
suggest that [lower courts] must treat [Kennedy's opinion] as a reluctant fifth vote against
justiciability... that may change in some future case but that holds, for the time being, that
this matter is nonjusticiable."); id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[F]ive Members of the
Court are convinced that the plurality's answer to [justiciability] is erroneous."). Ultimately,
they likely are both correct. See id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If
workable standards do emerge to measure these burdens ... courts should be prepared to
order relief." (emphasis added)).
82. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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II. THE INDIVIDUAL HARM OF POLITICS
The casting call of Vieth is not directionless. For all of their dif-
ferences, the Vieth opinions of Justice Kennedy and the four
dissenters were guided by many of the same democratic principles.
Part II.A will synthesize the Vieth opinions to characterize the un-
derlying harm of partisan gerrymandering in a way consistent with
those principles. Part II.B will step back from the case law and ex-
amine the populist roots of the Constitution, juxtaposing partisan
gerrymandering with a document that placed a premium on the
voice and will of "the People." Part II.C will tie these concepts of
democracy and constitutionalism together to argue that the overt
usage of partisan politics in districting is antithetical to popular
democracy and the essence of the Constitution as a populist
document, and therefore requires that Gaffney v. Cummings8 3 be
overruled.
A. FindingVieth's Common Ground
While they may differ on the type of harm, 4 the scope of in-
quiry,a5 and the appropriate judicial standard, 6 Justice Kennedy
and the Vieth dissenters do have common ground in the partisan
gerrymandering debate when it comes to the democratic princi-
ples at stake. Any attempt at reconciliation to achieve an
adjudicative path forward should start there. All five Justices rec-
ognize the need for democratic leaders both to remain responsive
to the electorate and govern impartially, and they recognize the
threat that partisan gerrymandering poses to these principles.
First and foremost, they appreciate that the will of "the People"
lies at the core of our democracy. "'We the People,' who 'ordained
and established' the American Constitution, sought to create and
to protect a workable form of government that is in its 'principles,
83. 412 U.S. 735 (1973); see discussion supra Part IA.
84. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing a
group representational right); id. at 327-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing individual,
group, and expressive harms); id. at 351 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing a group right to fair and effective representation); id. at 360-62 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the entrenchment of a minority).
85. Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (examining the district level); id. at 346 (Souter,
J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (examining the district level); id. at 360 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (examining the state level).
86. See supra note 11.
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structure, and whole mass,' basically democratic.""7 The chosen
method "for transforming the will of the majority into effective
government" is the legislature,88 a body "collectively responsible to
the popular will."" This role of the legislature is vital in a democ-
racy, for "[r]epresentative democracy in any populous unit of
governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band
together in promoting among the electorate candidates who es-
pouse their political views." 90
In addition to the need for elected representatives to be respon-
sive to the electorate, the five Justices also recognized the need for
them to govern impartially. This is not to say that representatives
need to abandon the politics that got them elected in the first
place, but "It] he ordered working of our Republic, and of the de-
mocratic process, depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in
all branches of government ... "9' "The Constitution enforces 'a
commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are
at stake.' ... Thus, the Equal Protection Clause implements a duty
to govern impartially that requires, at the very least, that every de-
cision by the sovereign serve some nonpartisan public purpose."92
Partisan gerrymandering threatens both principles. "[T]he in-
creasing efficiency of partisan redistricting has damaged the
democratic process to a degree that our predecessors only began
to imagine."93 "It is undeniable that political sophisticates under-
stand [the right to fair and effective representation] and how to go
about destroying it .... ",9 Partisan gerrymanders threaten legisla-
tive responsiveness because they "subvert [the] representative
norm .... [T] he winner of an election in a gerrymandered district
inevitably will infer that her success is primarily attributable to the
architect of the district rather than to a constituency defined by
neutral principles."99 "[T] he will of the cartographers rather than
the will of the people will govern."96 Partisan gerrymanders also
87. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 595 (1969)) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 356.
89. Id. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565
(1964)).
90. Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting California Democ-
ratic Party v.Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)).
91. Id. at 316 (KennedyJ., concurring in thejudgment).
92. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623
(1996)).
93. Id. at 345 (SouterJ.,joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 343-44 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 330 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 331.
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threaten impartiality. "[W]hen any pretense of neutrality is for-
saken unabashedly and all traditional districting criteria are
subverted for partisan advantage-the governing body cannot be
said to have acted impartially."9 7 In such circumstances, "one has
the sense that legislative restraint was abandoned."0
8
B. Popular Constitutionalism
The Framers drafted the Constitution as a means of furthering
populist democracy. Our first President exclaimed that "[t]he
power under the Constitution will always be in the People."9 Ordi-
nary citizens, not elected officials, define the attitudes and shape of
American democracy.00 Those that serve in elected office are not
there to serve themselves; they serve on behalf of, and at the pleas-
ure of, the electorate.' "In a world of popular constitutionalism,
government officials are the regulated, not the regulators .. .
The political landscape has changed since the Framing with the
development of an ardent two-party system,0 3 but the representa-
tive calculus has not. Whoever effectively governs, be it a
representative or a political party, may not usurp power from "the
People." The self-interest of partisan gerrymandering turns popu-
list democracy on its head, where "many of today's congressional
representatives owe their election not to 'the People of the several
states' but to the mercy of state legislatures."
0 4
The populism of the Constitution not only justifies the justicia-
bility of partisan gerrymandering, it requires it. As a means to the
end of democracy, the Constitution structures the processes of
government.'05 Malfunction of these processes occurs when those
97. Id. at 318.
98. Id. at 316 (KennedyJ., concurring in the judgment).
99. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 85 (2004) (quoting Letter from
George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 10, 1787)).
100. See RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE 48 (1999) (using a fictional story
of Italian fascism to describe the need for political mobilization of ordinary people).
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) ("[The] government ... derives all its
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by per-
sons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.");
see also Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 605 (discussing democratic accountability).
102. KRAMER, supra note 99, at 107.
103. See id. at 168 ("The 'voice of the people,' as such, was now expressed mainly by
elected representatives responding to political signals and popular movements as refracted
through the parties." (citation omitted)).
104. A New Map, supra note 12, at 1202 (citation omitted).
105. JOHN 1HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101
(1980).
[VOL. 39:1
A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing
in power manipulate the system to stay in power.0 6 Manipulating
elections is "the quintessential stoppage" in the democratic proc-
ess, since elections are the processes by which elected
representatives are held accountable to "the People."'' 7 Though
Justice O'Connor once stated that partisan gerrymandering is a "a
self-limiting enterprise" through political competition,' and the
potential exists for self-correction by the political branch,'0 9 eight-
een years effectively without judicial intervention has resulted in
some of the most elaborate gerrymanders and least competitive
elections in history."0 Those in power have a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo,"' even if that means sacrificing democ-
ratic principles to stay in power,' 2 and they clearly have succeeded
at doing so.
C. The Improper Role of Politics
After the utter failure of Bandemers Equal Protection standard,
some commentators advocated abandoning partisan gerrymander-
ing Equal Protection litigation in exchange for other constitutional
clauses." 3 Before throwing the baby out with the bathwater, how-
ever, it is important to ask why partisan gerrymandering is so
dangerous to democracy, and why Bandemer's test faired so poorly.
Partisan gerrymandering is harmful because it operates anti-
thetically to the purpose of the political process. By placing
political interests before the interests of the electorate, partisan
gerrymandering alters, if not frustrates, the will of "the People,"
rather than represents it. The act of the gerrymander itself creates
the injury to each individual voter's democratic representation.
106. Id. at 103.
107. Id. at 117.
108. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. See, e.g., Follow Arnold's Lead: Draw Bipartisan Voting Districts, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
July 24, 2005, at E2.
110. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 183-84; see supra note 8.
111. ELY, supra note 105, at 117 (citing HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION To DEMOC-
RATIC THEORY 120 (1960)).
112. See Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 622-23 (arguing that excessive gerrymandering
can inflict democratic harms beyond party composition in the legislature).
113. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Con-
sequences, 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 103, 106 (2000) (arguing for the Republican Form of
Government Clause); A New Map, supra note 12, at 1200-01 (2004) (arguing for the Elec-
tions Clause); Jamal Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause,
114YALE L.J. 1021, 1026-27 (2005) (arguing for the Elections Clause).
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The Bandemer test failed in part because it focused on the effects of
a partisan gerrymander, instead of the act of the gerrymander it-
self. This led it down the slippery slope of asking how much losing
is enough while avoiding a proportional representation require-
ment.
Similar to the Gaffney Court, the Vieth plurality inferred per se
constitutionality of partisan intent in districting due to its inevita-
ble political consequences. 4 But such an inquiry is more of a
conclusion than an analysis, and completely ignores the represen-
tational harms caused by partisan gerrymanders. The same holds
true for sweetheart gerrymanders. Though eight of the nine Jus-
tices in Vieth relied on the validity of Gaffney in assuming their
constitutionality,"5 "[a] bipartisan gerrymander employs the same
technique ... as does a partisan gerrymander."" 6 In both types of
gerrymanders, bare political self-interests subjugate democratic
representation. Though political parties have brought stability to117
governance, to allow their interests to override the individual
rights of the electorate would "confer[] greater rights on powerful
political groups than on individuals; that cannot be the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.""8
This is not to say that politics are per se impermissible."9 "It is
elementary that scrutiny levels are claim specific." 12 0 "[I]f a subsidi-
ary standard could show how an otherwise permissible
classification, as applied, burdens representational rights, we could
conclude that appellants' evidence states a provable claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment standard."1 1 When politics are utilized
as part of neutral districting criteria, e.g. respecting political subdi-
visions, then they have not subjugated representational interests
for political self-gain, and an individual voter has not suffered a
114. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285-86 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("The reality is that districting inevitably has and is
intended to have substantial political consequences.")); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 88-89 (1990).
115. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 351 n.6
(Souter, J.,joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id, at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf id. at 324
(Steven, J., dissenting) ("[T]he plurality errs in assuming that politics is 'an ordinary and
lawful motive.'").
116. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 154 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,joined by Burger, CJ.
& Rehnquist,J., concurring in the judgment).
117. E.g., id. at 144-45 ("There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and
stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective
government.").
118. Id. at 155.
119. See Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[P]artisan dis-
tricting is a lawful and common practice ...
120. Id. at 294.
121. Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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constitutional harm. On the other hand, when politics are used to
distort the democratic process, thereby burdening an individual
voter's representational rights, such usage sounds in Equal Protec-
tion.
As part of its defense of the supposed inherent permissibility of
using politics in districting, the plurality asserts the impossibility of
separating the two.1 22 However, one of the plurality's own footnotes
defeats this claim by noting how several states have shifted towards
123
removing political considerations from the districting process.
Iowa has utilized a non-partisan commission to perform its district-
ing free from such considerations for almost twenty-five years.124
While it is true that redistricting inherently creates political ef-
fects,125 such effects can be managed and corrected the way the
Framers intended them to be-with active, responsive representa-don.126
The plurality also asserts that political self-interest in gerryman-
dering is "a time-honored criterion.'' But "'our inquiry does not
begin with the judgment of history'; 'rather, inquiry must com-
mence with identification of the constitutional limitations
implicated by a challenged government practice.' ,1 28 Technological
advances not only have exacerbated the harm of partisan gerry-
mandering, but they have exposed more clearly the harm it inflicts
on democratic representation. The fact that recognition of this
122. Id. at 285-86 (plurality opinion) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753
(1973)).
123. Id. at 277 n.4 ("A number [of states] have adopted standards for redistricting, and
measures designed to insulate the process from politics."); see also IOWA CODE § 42.4 (2005).
124. E.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., Erase the Crooked Lines, LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 14, 2005, at 54.
Some commentators argue that one of the harms of partisan gerrymandering is its negative
impact on the competitiveness of elections. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 614 ("The
essence of republicanism then becomes not the lack of direct participation in government
by the demos but, critically, the fact that the elected representatives were forced to compete
in the arena of public accountability."); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 12, at 644 (arguing
political lock-up forestalls competition). See generally Katz, supra note 12, at 391 (arguing for
meaningful political participation). While 2002 had some of the least competitive congres-
sional elections in history, Hirsch, supra note 1, at 183-84, four of Iowa's five congressional
House races were highly competitive. Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 626 (citing Rigged Voting
Districts Rob Public of Choice, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2002, at 13A).
125. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("The reality is that districting in-
evitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences."); see also BORK, supra
note 114, at 88-89.
126. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 173 n.13 (1986) (Powell,J.,joined by Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] test that turns only on election results...
likely would identify an unconstitutional gerrymander where none existed.").
127. Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 300 (2004) (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 325 n.l (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 354-55 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
FALL 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
harm came relatively late in the game does not alter its imper-
missibility under the Equal Protection Clause.
Gaffney failed to identify the harm partisan gerrymandering in-
flicts upon representative democracy. Allowing politics to dominate
districting runs counter to popular democracy and the essence of
the Constitution as a populist document. Gaffney's holding that
"[p]olitics and political considerations are inseparable from dis-
tricting and apportionment"'2 should be overruled.
III. AJUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE PATH FORWARD
"A decision ordering the correction of all election district lines
drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts
to unprecedented intervention in the American political proc-
ess." 130 Such a decision not only might "lead to political instability
and judicial malaise," 3' but it also would be unnecessary. Not all
political considerations in districting are inherently bad. Some tra-
ditional, neutral districting principles involve political
considerations.3 2 In addition, those drawing the district lines likely
have some awareness of the districting's political implications,1
3
and the line between political consciousness and political intent is
not always clear. The proposed constitutional standard is offended
only when political interests subjugate democratic representa-
tion. T
To adjudicate these claims, courts should adopt the Shaw v. Reno
standard, finding a claim under the Equal Protection Clause when
"redistricting legislation ... is so extremely irregular on its face
that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate [parti-
san considerations] for purposes of voting, without regard for
traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compel-
129. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
130. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (2004) (KennedyJ., concurring in the judgment).
131. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., &
Rehnquist,J., concurring in the judgment).
132. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272-73 (preservation of local government boundaries); Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,959-60 (1996) (conformity to political subdivisions).
133. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) ("[T]he legislature always is aware of race
when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political
persuasion....").
134. See discussion supra Part II.C (arguing that the constitutional injury of partisan ger-
rymandering is a democratic representation harm suffered by individual voters); cf Shaw,
509 U.S. at 646 ("[R]ace consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race dis-
crimination.").
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ling justification.' ' 1 5 This standard would strike a balance between
respecting the inherently political process of redistricting using
traditional districting principles, while still catching the "excep-
tional cases" 36 where "legislation, though [partisan]-neutral on its
face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of [par-
tisan considerations] .... Perhaps most importantly, its relative
manageability has been proven in the race context.38 Though the
standard is not without its critics, '35it provides guidelines for courts
to use in making threshold determinations in what essentially is a
non-numerical inquiry.
40
In his Vieth dissent, Justice Stevens argued for this very test.'
However, he did so without disturbing Gaffney's holding that politi-
cal motivation is permissible, 1 2 attempting instead to heighten
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment by invoking First
Amendment cases. In addition, he cast the harm as simultaneously
individual, group, and expressive. 43 The Vieth plurality summarily
rejected his attempt at applying the Shaw standard to partisan ger-
rymandering based on the fact political considerations are not
suspect under Gaffney's view of the Equal Protection Clause.'44 This
135. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. Adopting the Shaw standard would nullify the "politics, not
race" escape from Shaw claims. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999) ("[A] juris-
diction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the
most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of
that fact." (citations omitted)).
136. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
137. Id. at 649.
138. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996).
139. E.g., id. at 1057, 1074, 1077 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissent-
ing); Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REv. 667, 694 (2002) ("[T]he Shaw
cases offer no prospect of a similarly manageable standard [to one-person, one-vote].").
140. See Pildes, supra note 8, at 2513 n.28 ("[T)he point is not to rank order all districts,
but to identify some threshold of extreme bizarreness ... ").
141. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I would apply
the standard set forth in the Shaw cases and ask whether the legislature allowed partisan
considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.");
see also id. at 326 ("[T]he critical issue in both racial and political gerrymandering cases is
the same: whether a single nonneutral criterion controlled the districting process to such an
extent that the Constitution was offended.").
142. Id. at 332 ("Political factors are common and permissible elements of the art of
governing a democratic society."); see also id. at 338 ("We have held ... that proportional
representation of political groups is a permissible objective . (citing Gaffney v. Cum-
mings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973))).
143. Id. at 327-28; see also Heather K Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Elec-
tion Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 522-24 (2004) (discussing
Justice Stevens's tripartite harm).
144. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285-86, 293 (plurality opinion).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Note answers the plurality's critique by identifying the individual
harm incurred under the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning the
need to overturn Gaffney and heighten scrutiny, and arguing why
the harm involved requires that result.
CONCLUSION
The harms that partisan gerrymandering imposes on individual
voters and on our democratic system of governance are both nu-
merous and complex. This Note simplified one of those harms in
an effort to find common ground on a divided Court and provide a
judicially manageable path forward. One answer that provides
some relief is better than having no answer and no relief' 5
In an ideal world, judges would never have to enter the political
thicket of partisan gerrymandering, but that does not mean that
they never should. The harms inflicted by partisan gerrymandering
strike at the very heart of our system of representative democracy.
Currently, the political system itself has demonstrated few signs of
self-regulation and correction. Recognizing the democratic harm
that partisan gerrymandering inflicts on the individual voter by
overruling Gaffney and adopting the Shaw standard to adjudicate
partisan gerrymandering claims is a judicially manageable way to
restore order to a broken system and vindicate the representation
rights of the electorate.
145. See id. at 354-55 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989)).
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